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Abstract
We study an individual’s incentive to search for a job in the presence of random
criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the indi-
vidual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches,
he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of optimal unemployment insur-
ance in this environment. If the individual is more likely to remain unemployed
and unpunished when he commits crime than when he searches for a job (as sug-
gested by empirical studies), declining unemployment benefits reduce the payoff
from crime relative to that from searching. Compared to the canonical models
of optimal unemployment insurance, this provides a further incentive to reduce
benefits over time.
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Moral hazard; Crime; Recursive con-
tracts.
JEL Classification: C61; D82; H55; J65; K42.
1 Introduction
It has long been accepted that, when deciding whether to commit crime, individuals
weigh up the gains from the act against, amongst other things, the income they forego
if they are punished. Those with higher income thus commit less crime. However, this
argument is incomplete. We present a possible counterexample grounded in a dynamic
model of unemployment, crime and social insurance with moral hazard.
∗We would like to thank James Albrecht, Winfried Koeniger, Albert Marcet, Antonio Mele, A´kos
Valentinyi and Susan Vromanand, as well as seminar participants at the University of Bath and Cardiff
University for their useful comments.
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An unemployed agent faces a decline in benefits. Each period, he can apply effort
searching for a job or can commit an opportunistic crime.1 As the agent’s benefit
declines, the marginal utility from accepting any given criminal opportunity increases.
This static effect increases the agent’s criminality. However, declining benefits cause the
continuation payoff from remaining unemployed to also fall over time. This generates
a second, dynamic, effect. If he searches, he weights the future in which he remains
unemployed (and hence receives said continuation payoff) by the probability of finding
a job. If he commits crime instead, he weights it by the probability of being punished.
Over time, these different weights mean that crime could become less attractive relative
to searching for a job. As the agent’s legitimate income from benefits declines, he
commits less crime. Static and dynamic effects exist under a range of assumptions. We
discuss both simultaneous job-search and criminal activities, as well as crime committed
by employed agents. Neither substantive affect the results of the model, although they
do make it more complicated.
The existence of crime also increases the moral hazard problem identified by Shavell
and Weiss 1979. The government is unable to observe the effort that the agent applies
in searching for a job. Criminal opportunities reduce this effort (and hence increase
the expected duration of unemployment) through two channels. Firstly, when the agent
commits crime, he is unable to search at all. He will definitely not find a job in the current
period. Secondly, as he will only accept criminal opportunities that are sufficiently
profitable to increase his utility, the welfare he expects to enjoy whilst unemployed is
higher. He is less concerned about finding a job, and hence applies lower effort in the
periods when he does choose to search.
We consider the optimal benefit schedule in such a setting. As with previous studies,
the government commits to providing the agent with a certain level of expected dis-
counted utility. It minimises the cost of this provision. By decreasing benefits over time,
it induces the agent to greater search effort. The introduction of opportunistic crime has
two effects. Firstly, since the agent receives additional utility by committing crime, the
government is able to offer lower benefits in every period without breaking its promise.
Secondly, as the continuation payoff from unemployment declines, the agent commits
less crime due to the dynamic effect. Since crime generates an additional cost to society,
1We refer to crime that has a direct financial motivation, undertaken by low-income individuals to
increase their means of subsistence. This definition mainly includes property crimes such as shoplifting,
burglary, robbery, theft and handling of stolen goods. This approach is adopted in the search literature
on crime and unemployment (c.f. Burdett et al. 2003, 2004; Imai and Krishna 2004). This literature
focuses on the opportunistic nature of a lot of property crime, rather than viewing it as a professional
activity.
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this provides a further incentive to front-load benefits. The continuation payoff falls
more rapidly. This result holds irrespective of the instantaneous utility function.
Studying the relationship between crime and the legitimate labour market has a
long history (starting with Ehrlich 1973). Since then, an extensive literature - both
theoretical and empirical - has developed. Recent work has focused on the decision
to commit crime in a search and matching setting (Burdett et al. 2003, 2004, Huang
et al. 2004, Engelhardt et al. 2008). Like our work, these contributions consider criminal
opportunities that arrive stochastically to individuals. There are, however, differences.
Unemployment benefits are constant, but wage offers vary. We endogenise the benefit
schedule, but all employed individuals receive the same wage. Additive separability of
legitimate and illegal income is assumed. As we shall see, this proves less innocuous
than hitherto imagined. Finally, since agents do not apply search effort, these papers
assume that they can simultaneously commit crime and look for a job. In this sense, our
contribution harks back to Ehrlich 1973 or Block and Heineke 1975. Accepted criminal
opportunities are time consuming, and so the agent must choose between searching and
crime.
Empirical studies into crime and unemployment abound. These invariably show that
there is a negative relationship between earnings per worker and crime (Grogger 1998,
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001, Gould et al. 2002). Our model supports this assertion.
Increases in the wage workers receive do indeed reduce criminality. However, changes
in unemployment benefits are a different matter. Surprisingly, little work has been
devoted to this. One exception is a recent study that attempts to estimate the effect of
not receiving benefits on different categories of crime (Fouge`re et al. 2009). Their results
are inconclusive. Whilst some crimes do increase, for others the effect is insignificant or
may even lead to a decline. These latter crimes tend to be more opportunistic in nature,
for example shoplifting or receiving stolen goods. Our results may go some way towards
explaining their findings.
Another example reviews the effect of a policy that toughened the eligibility criteria
for unemployment benefits in the United Kingdom (Machin and Marie 2006). Comparing
criminal activity before and after the policy was introduced, the authors did indeed find
that crime increased. This is indicative of the static effect. As the policy change had
been announced some time earlier, unemployed individuals would have already taken it
into account when considering future payoffs. Expecting their benefits to decline in the
future, the dynamic effect suggests that they would have begun to reduce their criminal
activity ex ante. As their current benefits were unaffected, the static effect was zero.
When the policy was finally introduced, the dynamic effect would have been zero, as
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the decline was already expected. The static effect, on the other hand, would be large,
explaining the rise in crime that the authors report.
For falling continuation payoffs from unemployment to reduce criminality, we require
that a searching agent is more likely to find a job than a criminal agent is to be pun-
ished. Empirical estimates support this claim (Imrohoroglu et al. 2004, Engelhardt et al.
2008). They find that the probability of finding a job is significantly higher than the
probability of being punished.2 Moreover, there are intrinsic biases in the estimates.
The probability of finding a job incorporates all those who are unemployed, including
criminals. The estimate conditional on searching should be higher. Similarly, estimates
of the probability of punishment are based upon police clearance rates. However, a
large proportion of crimes are not reported to the police. We would therefore expect the
true likelihood of being caught to be lower than the empirical estimates. One exception
to this criticism estimates a structural model to derive these values (Engelhardt 2010).
The estimates are more stark, and suggest that the probability of finding a job may be
an order of magnitude higher over one month than the probability of a criminal being
punished.
Whilst unemployment benefits provide an important safety net to those who lose a
job, it has often been suggested that it reduces the incentive to search for a job (for
a discussion, see Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976). The optimal unemployment insurance
literature considers the most cost-effective way to provide a safety net, whilst mitigating
the problems of reduced search effort (Shavell andWeiss 1979). It prescribes that benefits
are gradually reduced over time. By doing so, an unemployed agent faces a declining
continuation payoff to remaining unemployed. This provides them with a greater (and
increasing) incentive to apply effort to search for a job. The approach has been shown
to be desirable, even incorporating its funding (Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997) or its
consequences for voters (Pollak 2007).
We adopt a model similar to that of Shavell and Weiss, but expand it to include
outside criminal opportunities as in the search literature on crime. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to attempt to do this. In many advanced economies, com-
mitting crime more than participating in informal sector activities is the main way for
low-income individuals facing liquidity constraints to finance their expenditures. Foley
2011 finds that committing crime to smooth consumption patterns between welfare pay-
ments is a recurrent phenomenon in the United States among welfare beneficiaries. The
Ministry of Justice and Department for Work and Pensions (2011) in the United King-
2One exception is Burdett et al. 2004, who use a far lower probability of finding a job than comparable
papers.
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dom finds that about one-third of unemployment benefit claims are made by offenders
and that about 70 per-cent of offenders committing theft and handling of stolen goods
offences were claiming benefits at some point in the month before their sentence date.
Some have, however, considered the problem of optimal unemployment insurance
when individuals access informal labour markets to compensate for their income loss
during unemployment. This seems particularly relevant for developing countries, with
large shares of the informal sector relative to the official economy. Pavoni 2007 suggests
that concerns about unemployed individuals participating in the informal labor market
justify the provision of a constant nonzero minimum level of benefits to those individ-
uals in long-term unemployment. A´lvarez Parra and Sa´nchez 2009 derive the nonzero
lower bound as an outcome of the optimal contract when the return from activities in
the informal labor market is accounted for by the planner. The nonzero lower bound
has the effect of smoothing consumption for long-term unemployed as the income from
labor in the informal sector compensates for the loss of unemployment insurance when
benefits reach zero under the optimal contract. We find a similar result in the solution
to the optimal unemployment contract with crime. A nonzero lower bound on the con-
sumption of long-term unemployed is implicit in our model as they always have access
(in expectations) to income from criminal opportunities.
Previous work has also investigated optimal sanctioning of benefits following moni-
toring of search effort (Boone et al. 2007). The optimality in their contribution comes
not from varying benefits over time, but from the choice of the monitoring technology
and sanction for unacceptable search effort. We adopt the opposite approach, taking
the monitoring technology and sanction as given, and instead focusing on using bene-
fits to influence both search effort and criminality simultaneously. Monitoring is costly,
whereas adjusting the benefit schedule received by the agent is relatively cheap to do.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a model of
unemployment insurance with opportunistic crime. Section 3 discusses how the agent
responds to the benefits on offer. Section 4 reports results for constant benefits. This
provides a simpler environment in which to derive analytical results, and provides a point
of comparison with the previous literature. Section 5 considers optimal unemployment
insurance. The paper then turns to numerical methods. Sections 6 provides details of
the calibration and computational techniques. Section 7 then illustrates numerically the
main theoretical results of the paper. Section 8 concludes. Major proofs and details of
the computational method are given in the appendices.
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2 The Economic Environment
We present an infinite-horizon model of unemployment insurance, similar to that of
Shavell and Weiss 1979. The government is committed to providing an unemployed
agent with expected lifetime utility V . It provides a stream of unemployment benefits
{bt}
∞
t=0 in order to meet this commitment.
We introduce criminal activity into this model, as in the search literature on crime
(Burdett et al. 2003, 2004; Imai and Krishna 2004). Each period, the agent receives
a private criminal opportunity denoted by ct ≥ 0. Each ct is i.i.d., and drawn from
some distribution F (c) with density f(c). The agent then chooses whether to search
for work (st = 1) or accept the opportunity (st = 0).
3 His instantaneous utility is
u(yt, (1 − st)ct) where yt is the agent’s legitimate income and (1 − st)ct is the income
from an accepted criminal opportunity. We assume that utility is increasing and concave
in both arguments, and that the Inada conditions hold.
When searching for a job, the agent exerts effort at ≥ 0. He receives instantaneous
utility u(bt, 0)− at and finds a job with probability p(at). p(·) is increasing and concave.
No effort implies no job (p(0) = 0), but neither is a job ever guaranteed (p(∞) <
1). Should his search be successful, the agent receives a wage, yt = w, and hence
utility, u(w, 0), in all future periods. The model is one of imperfect information, as the
government cannot observe either ct, st or at.
If instead the agent accepts the criminal opportunity, he receives instantaneous utility
u(bt, ct). However, he is unable to search for a job. He may also be punished, which
begins in the following period with probability φ. A criminal who is punished is no
longer entitled to welfare under the current scheme.
The agent seeks to maximise his discounted utility:
max
{at,st}∞t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(yt, (1− st)ct)− stat}
]
. (1)
where β is the discount factor and E0[·] denotes the expectation conditional on the agent’s
information in t = 0. Each period, an unemployed agent chooses whether to search. If
he searches (st = 1), he then chooses optimal search effort and receives u(bt, 0) − at.
Otherwise (if st = 0) he receives u(bt, ct). Uncertainty exists over whether the agent
3This approach captures the opportunistic nature of crime. As we will show, the agent commits
crime in some periods, but not in others. An alternative timing protocol could consist of the agent
choosing whether to search for a job before observing his criminal opportunity. This would imply that
his decision would be based upon the expected value from criminal income. In equilibrium, the agent
either always searches or always commits crime.
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receives a job offer when searching, gets punished when committing crime, as well as the
value of future criminal opportunities.
The government aims to minimise the expected discounted cost of providing unem-
ployment insurance, incorporating the potential criminal activities of the agent. Crime
not only provides an alternative source of income, it also inflicts an external cost upon
society (c.f. Becker 1968, Shavell 1987). The size of this damage is given by d(ct, δ).
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More intensive crime inflicts more damage (dc(·) > 0). δ reflects how destructive crime
is (dδ(·) > 0) and will be used in later sections to derive comparative statics results. The
government’s problem is:
min
{bt}∞t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt{bt + (1− st)d(ct, δ)}
]
, (2)
subject to the expected lifetime utility of the agent given by (1) being greater than V .
During each period of unemployment, the government provides bt. If the agent commits
crime (st = 0), the government also suffers the cost of this activity. The government
is unable to observe the agent’s search effort or his criminality (there is moral hazard),
and hence forms expectations over these actions.
Government sets benefit schedule:
{bt}
∞
t=0
Agent is unemployed
Agent gets criminal opportunity:
ct ≥ 0
Commits crime:
u(bt, ct)
Searches:
u(bt, 0)− at
Punished
Employed:
u(w, 0)
1− p(at)
st = 0st = 1
φp(at)
1− φ
Figure 1: The timing of the model.
Figure 1 summarises the timing. The government commits to a benefit schedule,
{bt}
∞
t=0. In each period of unemployment, the agent receives a criminal opportunity,
4This damage could incorporate the expected cost of punishment, as well as the cost of any post-
punishment welfare support.
7
which he can accept (st = 0) or reject (st = 1). If he accepts, he commits the crime,
receives u(bt, ct) and either remains unemployed or gets punished (an absorbing state).
If he rejects, he exerts effort searching for a job and receives u(bt, 0) − at. In this case,
he is either successful (another absorbing state), or he remains unemployed. We proceed
to solve the model by backwards induction, starting with the agent’s response to the
announced benefits schedule.
Note that both employment and punishment are absorbing states in this environ-
ment. Allowing for movement back into unemployment will have no qualitative effect
the agent’s decisions. Upon becoming unemployed again, his expected discounted util-
ity will simply be V . With exogenous transition probabilities, this is just a constant.
Employment is, nevertheless, often modelled as an absorbing state in this literature (c.f.
Shavell and Weiss 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; Pavoni 2007). This simplifies the
government’s decision substantially, as it does not need to worry about future promises
of insurance when minimising the cost of its provision.
3 Agent Decisions
The agent’s utility maximisation problem (1) can be represented recursively by the
following system of Bellman equations:
V e =
u(w, 0)
1− β
, (3)
V ut = max
at≥0
{u(bt, 0)− at + βp(at)V
e + β(1− p(at))Vt+1} , (4)
V ct = u(bt, ct) + βφV
p + β(1− φ)Vt+1, (5)
V t = max
st∈{0,1}
{stV
u
t + (1− st)V
c
t }, (6)
Vt+1 = Et
[
V t+1
]
. (7)
Equation (4) addresses search effort, conditional on searching for a job. The agent
receives his benefits, but suffers the cost of effort. With probability p(at) he finds a job,
and receives value of employment, V e, given by (3). Otherwise he remains unemployed,
and receives a continuation payoff Vt+1. The agent maximises this payoff over search
effort.
Equation (5) gives the payoff from committing a crime in the current period. The
agent receives his benefits from the government, as well as income from accepting the
criminal opportunity. In the following period, with probability φ he gets punished, and
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receives continuation payoff V p. With probability 1 − φ he remains unpunished, and
receives the same continuation payoff as an unemployed agent.
Next, (6) addresses the decision whether to search for a job or accept a criminal
opportunity. The agent will search if and only if V ut ≥ V
c
t .
Finally, (7) states the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed. The agent
knows that he will choose st+1 to maximise his payoff next period, given the benefit
schedule provided by the government. He will thus receive V t+1. However, he does not
know the value of the criminal opportunity, and so forms an expectation.
The agent has two decisions to make. Firstly, conditional on searching for a job, he
chooses search effort. His optimal effort, a∗t , is derived from the first order condition
from (4):
βp′(a∗t ) (V
e − Vt+1) ≤ 1. (8)
The form of this first order condition is similar to Shavell and Weiss 1979. The left hand
side represents the marginal benefit of effort. This is proportional to the utility gain the
agent enjoys when moving from unemployment into work, V e − Vt+1, starting from the
following period. The right hand side gives the (constant) marginal cost. Since p(at)
is concave, the agent will apply more effort if the payoff from getting a job increases
relative to that from remaining unemployed.
Note that, since the marginal cost of effort is positive, there exists a V max < V e such
that a∗t = 0 for all Vt+1 ≥ V
max:
V max = V e −
1
p′(0)
(9)
When Vt+1 = V
max, there still exists a positive marginal benefit to the agent of applying
effort to searching for a job: the utility gain is positive. Unfortunately, this marginal
benefit is insufficient to compensate for the marginal cost, and the agent optimally
applies no effort to searching. We will refer to V max − Vt+1 as the adjusted utility gain
from employment throughout the paper. Whilst it tracks the actual utility gain one-for-
one, it has the added benefit that the agent will apply effort if and only if the adjusted
utility gain from employment is positive.
Consideration of (8) leads us to our first result:
Proposition 1 (Crime exacerbates Moral Hazard) The presence of criminal op-
portunities extends the expected duration of the agent’s unemployment relative to the
canonical model.
Relative to the canonical model, the determinants of the continuation value from
9
remaining unemployed, Vt+1, are different. If the agent receives an unprofitable criminal
opportunity in the following period, he will search for a job and receive V ut+1 (by (6)),
as per the model without crime. However, if the opportunity is sufficiently profitable
to induce him to accept it, he must receive a higher payoff, V ct+1 ≥ V
u
t+1. The expected
payoff from remaining unemployed is therefore higher. Even if the agent does choose
to search, he applies lower effort in equilibrium. Moral hazard is exacerbated. In this
sense, crime can lead to unemployment, as the agent is less likely to find a job.
Secondly, whether the agent searches at all depends upon the criminal opportunity
he receives. By committing crime, the agent gives up future utility. He will not get a
job, and may get arrested. In order to compensate for this, the criminal opportunity
must be sufficiently large:
Proposition 2 (Threshold Criminal Opportunities) For any benefits schedule, there
exists a sequence of threshold criminal opportunities, {c∗t}
∞
t=0, each defined by:
u(bt, c
∗
t ) ≡ u(bt, 0)− a
∗
t + βp(a
∗
t )V
e + β[φ− p(a∗t )]Vt+1 − βφV
p, (10)
such that the agent will search for a job in period t if and only if ct ≤ c
∗
t .
Proof. See Appendix A
This period’s opportunity has no impact upon the continuation payoff conditional
on not finding a job or being punished, Vt+1. It therefore does not affect V
u
t (by (4)).
Conversely, by (5) higher criminal opportunities increase V ct . The agent enjoys the
payoff from his crimes, u(bt, ct). From (6), the agent will only accept an opportunity if
V ct ≥ V
u
t . c
∗
t is the opportunity that makes the agent indifferent. Any ct > c
∗
t raises V
c
t
above V ut , and induces the agent to accept. Likewise any ct < c
∗
t lowers V
c
t below V
u
t
and causes the agent to search.
Careful consideration of (10) provides a surprising result alluded to in the introduc-
tion. Casual intuition would suggest that, as unemployment benefits decline over time,
the agent would commit more crime. With lower legitimate income in each period, the
marginal utility of illegal income increases. We call this the static effect. This need
not be the case in a dynamic setting, as future considerations may offset this incentive
(a dynamic effect).
Proposition 3 (Criminality and the Continuation Payoff) There exists V˜ such
that the agent’s criminality decreases as the continuation payoff from unemployment
declines if and only if:
Vt+1 ≤ V˜ .
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The probability that the agent commits a crime in any period of unemployment is
1 − F (c∗t ), the probability of receiving a worthwhile criminal opportunity. So for his
criminality to decrease as the continuation payoff from unemployment shrinks, we need
that c∗t increases. We can write:
−
∂c∗t
∂Vt+1
= −
β(1− p(a∗t ))
uc(bt, c∗t )
+
β(1− φ)
uc(bt, c∗t )
. (11)
Reducing the continuation payoff has an impact upon the threshold criminal opportunity
through two channels. The expected discounted future utility from searching for a job
is p(a∗t )V
e + (1 − p(a∗t ))Vt+1. A lower continuation payoff reduces this, and the risk of
remaining jobless looms larger. For any given effort level, this static effect makes crime
more appealing, and tends to lower the threshold opportunity (the first term in (11)).
However, reducing Vt+1 also reduces V
c for the same reason. The expected discounted
future utility from crime is φV p + (1 − φ)Vt+1. This dynamic effect tends to increase
the threshold opportunity (the second term in (11)). If the agent is more likely to get
a job when searching than get punished after committing crime (i.e. if p(a∗t ) > φ), his
expected discounted future utility from crime will fall faster than that from searching.
The agent’s criminality will decline.
In order for the agent to discount the likelihood of remaining unemployed whilst
searching heavily, he must be induced to a reasonably high search effort. From (8), this
requires that the continuation payoff from unemployment must be sufficiently smaller
than that of employment. This assumption fits with the observed transition probabilities,
as noted in the introduction.
The results of this section are robust to a range of alternative assumptions. The
agent bases his decision on a stationary value of employment. This could incorporate
criminal opportunities taken whilst working, without affecting the main results. Since
wages are costant, the employed agent’s threshold criminal opportunity would also be
constant. Allowing on-the-job crime would simply raise V e, without affecting any other
aspect of the model.
Empirical estimates of the different job-finding rates between criminals and non-
criminals also suggest that the results would hold even if the agent could commit crime
and search simultaneously. Suppose that if the agent does not commit crime he applies
effort aNt , whereas if he commits crime he applies a
C
t . Since the agent may be punished
as a result of criminal activity (superseding any job offer) the marginal benefit to search
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effort is lower: aCt < a
N
t . In this case, Proposition 3 would require that:
[1− p(aNt )]− (1− φ)[1− p(a
C
t )] < 0
⇐⇒ p(aNt ) > φ+ p(a
C
t )(1− φ).
Engelhardt 2010 reports that the monthly p(aNt ) ≥ 0.378 at the 95% confidence level,
whereas p(aCt ) ≤ 0.179 and φ ≤ 0.014. For these values, φ+ p(a
C
t )(1− φ) = 0.190, well
below the job finding rate for an agent who does not commit crime.
4 Constant Unemployment Insurance
The literature on unemployment and crime is dominated by the assumption of constant
benefits (c.f. Burdett et al. 2003, 2004, Engelhardt et al. 2008, Engelhardt 2010). This
provides a useful benchmark to compare some of the analytical results deriving from our
framework. The agent’s problem is still described by (4) - (6), but with the additional
restriction that bt = b. In this case, however, the problem is stationary. The agent’s
optimal choices a∗cb and c
∗
cb (cb denotes constant benefits), along with the optimal con-
tinuation payoff Vcb are constant, and given by the solution to the following system of
simultaneous equations:
βp′(a∗cb) (V
e − Vcb) = 1, (12)
u(b, c∗cb) = u(b, 0)− a
∗
cb + βp(a
∗
cb)V
e + β(φ− p(a∗cb))Vcb − βφV
p, (13)
Vcb =
∫∞
c=c∗
cb
u(b, c)f(c)dc+ F (c∗cb)u(b, c
∗
cb) + βφV
p
1− β(1− φ)
, (14)
The first two equations are equivalent to (8) and (10). The third equation defines
the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed. With probability 1 − F (c∗cb) a
sufficiently good opportunity comes along to induce the agent to commit crime. He
expects to receive
∫∞
c=c∗
cb
u(b, c) f(c)
1−F (c∗
cb
)
dc in the current period and (1 − φ)Vcb + φV
p in
the future. Otherwise (with probability F (c∗cb)) the agent receives V
u. Substituting for
V u using (4) and (13), and then solving for Vcb yields (14).
Suppose that the government increases the unemployment benefit it offers. Higher
benefits increase the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed for the obvious
reason. As a result, if the agent does not receive an acceptable criminal opportunity, he
lowers his search effort. The effect on his criminality is interesting:
Lemma 1 (Criminality and Benefits) If ∂
2u
∂b∂ct
≥ 0, the agent’s criminality declines
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as benefits declines:
−
∂c∗cb
∂b
> 0.
The proof follows a simple application of the Implicit Function Theorem to (12) - (14).
This yields that −
∂c∗
cb
∂b
> 0 if and only if:
{ub(b, c
∗
cb)− ub(b, 0)} − β[φ− p(a
∗
cb)]
∫∞
c∗
cb
ub(b, c)f(c)dc+ F (c
∗
cb)ub(b, c
∗
cb)
1− β(1− φ)
> 0. (15)
The first term in parentheses in (15) relates to the static effect. It compares the marginal
utility of benefits with and without accepting the threshold criminal opportunity. If
∂2u
∂b∂ct
< 0 then the term is negative. A fall in benefits increases the static incentive to
commit crime. Conversely, if ∂
2u
∂b∂ct
≥ 0 as, for example, would be the case with additive
separable utility, then falling benefits weakly reduce the static incentive to commit crime.
The second term in (15) describes the dynamic effect. The fall in benefits reduces
the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed. Following (11), this increases the
threshold criminal opportunity. The expected continuation payoff from crime, φV p+(1−
φ)Vcb, decreases faster than the expected continuation payoff from searching, p(a
∗
cb)V
e+
(1 − p(a∗cb))Vcb, as 1 − φ > 1 − p(a
∗
cb). This makes crime less appealing, and, at the
margin, tends to increase c∗cb.
Summarising, if ∂
2u
∂b∂ct
≥ 0, both static and dynamic effects lead to a reduction in
criminality. Crime is (weakly) less appealing in terms of instantaneous utility, and
(strictly) less appealing in terms of future discounted utility. If ∂
2u
∂b∂ct
< 0, the two
effects counteract one another. Whilst crime is more appealing immediately, it is still
less appealing in terms of future utility. Criminality may therefore increase or decrease
depending upon the magnitude of each effect.
Whilst Lemma 1 seems to conflict with a lot of the empirical work, it is worth noting
that this literature tends to focus on workers’ earnings. Our model is entirely consistent
with their findings:
Lemma 2 (Criminality and Wages) Criminality declines as wages from employment
increase:
∂c∗cb
∂w
> 0.
As wages increase, the payoff from getting a job rises relative to remaining unemployed.
This directly increases the expected payoff from searching. Moreover, the marginal
benefit of search effort increases, raising effort and causing the agent to place a higher
probability on a successful search. This further increases the payoff from searching,
reducing the criminality of the agent.
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We can also assess the impact of anti-crime policies in this setting. Consider an
increase in the probability of conviction, φ. If Vcb > V
p, this lowers the continuation
payoff to crime. The agent is less willing to accept criminal opportunities. c∗cb increases
in (13). Although the increase in c∗cb raises Vcb in (14), it is discounted more heavily
due to the high likelihood of being punished. Overall, Vcb declines. In (12), the optimal
search effort thus increases.
More severe punishment (a fall in V p) will have a similar effect. The agent will be
less willing to commit crime, as the continuation payoff from being caught has fallen in
(13). It also reduces the expected continuation payoff from crime in (14). Once again,
since unemployment is less comfortable than previously, optimal effort increases.
5 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We now consider optimal unemployment insurance. The government announces the
benefit schedule prior to any decisions by the agent. Although it does not observe these
decisions, it knows how the agent will react to its policy. It is thus in a position to not
only choose benefits in each period, but also (implicitly) the agent’s effort and threshold
criminal opportunity.
The agent’s reaction to the benefits schedule allow us to be more explicit about three
elements of the model that are important for the government’s decision. The probability
of remaining unemployed:
P(Unemployed in t+ 1|Unemployed in t) = (1− F (c∗t ))(1− φ) + F (c
∗
t )(1− p(a
∗
t ))
= 1− φ+ F (c∗t )(φ− p(a
∗
t )).
The probability that the agent receives a worthwhile criminal opportunity in period t is
1 − F (c∗t ). In this case, he remains unemployed with probability 1 − φ. Otherwise, he
remains unemployed with probability 1− p(a∗t ).
The government does not observe the criminal opportunity that the agent receives.
However, it knows that the agent only accepts opportunities above c∗t . The expected
payoff from an accepted opportunity is:
E [u(bt, c)|c ≥ c
∗
t ] =
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
u(bt, c)
f(c)
1− F (c∗t )
dc.
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Similarly the expected damage caused by an accepted criminal opportunity is:
E [d(c, δ)|c ≥ c∗t ] =
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
d(c, δ)
f(c)
1− F (c∗t )
dc.
The government never observes the criminal opportunity received by the agent, nor
whether he chose to accept it. So, in period t, it has the same information about the
agent’s welfare as the agent himself had in period t− 1. The government’s expectation
of the agent’s discounted lifetime utility from being unemployed in period t is simply
Vt. Following the recursive contracts literature (Spear and Srivastava 1987; Phelan
and Townsend 1991), the problem of minimising the expected discounted cost to the
government of providing these benefits given by (2) can be represented recursively as
follows:
C (Vt) = min
bt,a
∗
t ,c
∗
t ,Vt+1
{
bt +
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
d(c, δ)f(c)dc+ β[1− φ+ F (c∗t )(φ− p(a
∗
t ))]C (Vt+1)
}
(16)
subject to:
Vt ≤F (c
∗
t ) {u(bt, 0)− a
∗
t + βp(a
∗
t )V
e + β(1− p(a∗t ))Vt+1}
+ (1− F (c∗t ))
{∫ ∞
c=c∗t
u(bt, c)
f(c)
1− F (c∗t )
dc+ β(1− φ)Vt+1 + βφV
p
}
(17)
(8) and (10)
where V1 = V , the amount promised by the government upon becoming unemployed.
Equation (16) describes the cost of providing unemployment insurance. In the current
period, the government provides benefit bt. It only suffers damage from crime if the
agent chooses to accept his opportunity rather than searching for a job (if ct > c
∗
t ). In
the following period, assuming that the agent neither finds a job or gets punished, the
government is still committed to providing Vt+1 expected lifetime utility. Following the
work of Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997, we assume that C(·) is increasing and convex.
Equation (17) is the promise-keeping constraint. It requires that the unemployed
agent’s expected discounted utility is at least Vt. With probability F (c
∗
t ), the criminal
opportunity is insufficient to induce the agent to commit crime. He receives V ut , and
apply effort a∗ to finding a job. Otherwise, he commits crime and receives (in expec-
tation)
∫∞
c=c∗
V cf(c)dc. Constraints (8) and (10) incorporate the agent’s responses into
the policy decision.
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The solution to (16) is as follows:
Proposition 4 (Optimal Unemployment Insurance) For any instantaneous util-
ity function, u(yt, (1− st)ct), if Vt ≤ V˜ then the optimal unemployment insurance sched-
ule involves reducing the continuation payoff from unemployment over time.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition behind this result is very similar to that of the canonical model. By
paying the majority of the promised utility in the early stages of unemployment, the gov-
ernment creates a declining expected continuation payoff from remaining unemployed.
Since the agent knows that his situation will only get worse in the future, he applies more
effort to search for a job. When crime is introduced, a second channel opens up through
the dynamic effect. Reducing the continuation payoff from unemployment causes the
payoff from crime to decline faster than the payoff from searching. The agent foregoes
criminal opportunities that would previously have been attractive, in order to try to get
a job. Reducing the continuation payoff thus reduces crime as well.
The impact of the dynamic effect on the optimal unemployment insurance schedule
with opportunistic crime can be further drawn out by considering how the schedule
changes when the cost of crime (as measured by δ) increases:
Lemma 3 (Crime Increases Front-Loading of Welfare) For any instantaneous util-
ity function, u(yt, (1 − st)ct), when the damage associated with opportunistic crime in-
creases, the continuation payoff from unemployment declines.
When the damage from crime increases, its significance in the cost of supporting
the unemployed agent increases. The government becomes more inclined to use the
benefit schedule as an anti-crime policy tool. Taking advantage of the dynamic effect,
it reduces the continuation payoff more rapidly. This tends to lower the agent’s utility
in every period, as well as reduce his utility from crime. The agent becomes worse off.
The government has breached its promise to provide the agent with a given amount of
welfare. To adjust for this, whilst still reducing crime, the government further front-
loads welfare. In the early stages of unemployment, it is more generous than it had
previously been. This enables it to lower the agent’s welfare more rapidly, eventually
reducing the continuation payoff below that of the original scheme.
The static effect does create added complications for optimal benefit payments, as
we saw in Lemma 1. On the one hand, falling benefits lower the continuation payoff over
time, as already mentioned. However, it also potentially increases the utility gain from a
given criminal opportunity. Legitimate income is lower, so the marginal utility of crime
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may be higher. This muddies the water regarding whether benefits should optimally
decline. However, if we make an additional assumption about the form of the utility
function, we can be more explicit:
Proposition 5 (Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Additive Separability)
If Vt ≤ V˜ and utility from legitimate income and crime is additively separable, then the
optimal unemployment insurance schedule involves reducing benefit payments over time.
Proof. See Appendix D.
If utility from legitimate and illegal income is additively separable, declining benefits
will have no impact upon the marginal utility of crime.5 There is no static effect. Only
the dynamic effect remains. The optimal policy will still lead to the continuation payoff
from unemployment falling, increasing the agent’s incentive to search for a job and
unambiguously lowering his criminality.
6 Calibration and computation
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the parameters for the numerical analysis. Unless
otherwise stated, parameters will be maintained at these baseline values. Instantaneous
utility is given by u (yt, (1− st)ct) =
y1−σt
1−σ
+ [(1−st)ct]
1−σ
1−σ
. Following Hopenhayn and Nicol-
ini 1997, we set σ = 0.5. The probability of finding a job is p (a) = 1 − exp (−ra).
The parameter r > 0 is calibrated so that p (a∗t ) = 0.1 in the stationary equilibrium
without unemployment insurance. The discount rate is β = 0.999, and the weekly wage
is w = 100.
Criminal opportunities are specified over a finite and discrete grid of n = 4001
equally spaced points; ci, i = 1, .., n. It varies from zero (c1 = 0) to twice the weekly
wage (cn = 200). The probability of receiving a criminal opportunity is given by a
discretised exponential probability density function:
qi =
f (ci|µ)∑n
j=1 f (cj|µ)
, (18)
with f (ci|µ) =
1
µ
e−
i
µ , and i = 1, ..., n. An increase in µ leads to an increase in the
probability of earning high income from crime. As µ becomes infinitely large the PDF
of each criminal opportunity tends towards the uniform distribution. In the numerical
analysis we examine the sensitivity of the results to different values of µ.
5This assumption is ubiquitous in the search and matching literature, and is employed by Burdett
et al. 2003, 2004, Engelhardt et al. 2008 and Engelhardt 2010.
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When using the job-finding probability function of Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997,
V max = V e − 1
rβ
from (9). The adjusted utility gain from employment is therefore:
V max − Vt+1 = V
e − Vt+1 −
1
rβ
For given r and β, the adjusted utility gain from employment and actual utility gain
from employment move one-to-one. However, when V max − Vt+1 = 0, then a
∗
t = 0.
The benchmark conviction rate is set to φ = 1.56E−4. This is derived starting from
the annual unemployment incarceration rate of 18.5 per cent and the average prison
duration (APD) of 12 months for property crime reported by Imrohoroglu et al. 2004.
The weekly probability of being convicted is then calculated as 0.0039.6 Since we treat
punishment as an absorbing state, we then rescale φ so that the expected punishment
from 12 months in prison with a conviction probability of 0.0039 is the same as the
that for a life sentence (an APD of 25 years). The benchmark conviction rate φ is thus
measured as 4 per cent (= 1
25
) of this value. We also examine the sensitivity of the
results when the APD is 6, 9, 15 and 18 months by rescaling appropriately.
The damage from crime is proportional to the utility from a criminal opportunity:
d (ci) = δ
c
1−η
i
1−η
, i = 1, 2, ..., n. In the benchmark computation we assume δ = 1. To derive
this, we first collect an estimate of the average social cost of property crime reported
by Cohen and Piquero 2009. To link this to the criminal’s payoff, we then compute
the average value of stolen property per crime from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010). Comparing these two estimates suggests that
the damage from property crime is of the same order as the criminal’s payoff. Again,
different values for the factor δ are used to examine the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the cost of crime.
The solution to the model under constant unemployment insurance is derived by
iterating the agent’s Bellman equations (4) - (6), given (3) and (7). Starting from an
initial arbitrary value of V , r is determined from the FOC (8) using the stationary equi-
librium value of the search probability when b = 0. This is then replaced into p (a∗t )
to determine the stationary equilibrium search intensity a∗t , which in turn can be used
to compute V u and V c in (4) and update V in (7). Once convergence is achieved, the
stationary equilibrium threshold income from crime is computed from (10). This allows
6The probability of being convicted at some point during the year (0.185) is equal to the probability
of being convicted in the first week (φ) plus the probability of escaping in the first week, but being
convicted in the second ((1 − φ)φ), plus the probability of escaping in the first two weeks, but being
convicted in the third ((1 − φ)2φ) etc. Summing the geometric progression over all 52 weeks yields
φ(1−φ)53
1−(1−φ) = (1− φ)
53 = 0.185. Solving yields φ = 0.0039.
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration of the model parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.999 Discount rate
w 100 Wage
σ 0.5 Relative risk aversion unemployed
φ 1.56E − 04 Incarceration prob., based on 12 months APD
δ 1 Damage from crime in % of utility from crime
c1 0 Minimum payoff from crime
cn 200 Maximum payoff from crime
n 4001 Number of possible criminal opportunities
V p 0 Value of punishment
µ 5000 Parameter of PDF income from crime
the computation of the expected value of a criminal opportunity and the cumulative
probability of the utility from not committing crime - the first and second terms respec-
tively on the numerator of (14) - consistent with the stationary equilibrium solution for
the continuation value Vcb. This algorithm can be implemented for any constant value
of b.
The numerical solution under optimal insurance is derived using an algorithm based
upon Chebyshev polynomials. We perform the computation in three stages. Firstly,
the original government problem of minimizing the cost function (16) with respect to
four variables, is reduced to minimization over a single variable. This is done using the
constraints in (8), (10) and (17) to eliminate bt, a
∗
t and c
∗
t as choice variables from the
Bellman equation (16), thereby reducing the minimization over Vt+1 alone. Chebyshev
polynomial approximation applies to functions on bounded intervals. For this reason,
in the second stage, we derive upper and lower bounds for the continuation payoff from
remaining unemployed Vt+1. The agent can never be worse off than in the absence
of unemployment insurance. From (12) - (14), substituting b = 0 identifies the lower
bound V min. Similarly the government would never wish to give sufficient insurance
as to provide no incentive to search for a job. This identifies an upper bound for the
continuation value V max from (8) with a∗t = 0. We are now in a position in which we
can solve the government’s problem.
In the third stage, we implement the algorithm for the numerical derivation of the
solution. The approximator is based on a fifth-order Chebyshev polynomial with 15
interpolation nodes. The approximate solution is derived by adapting the Chebyshev
regression algorithm proposed by Judd 1998 (pp. 223) to the minimisation problem
defined in the first stage. See Appendix E for a detailed discussion of the computational
method.
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7 Results
7.1 Constant Unemployment Insurance
Figure 2 depicts the stationary equilibrium solution with constant b = 0 for three al-
ternative distributions of criminal opportunities. The panels on the left side plot the
associated PDFs. Those on the right side display the corresponding values of unemploy-
ment V ut , crime V
c
t and the expected continuation payoff from remaining unemployed
Vcb (given by (4), (5) and (14) respectively) for different realisations of the current pe-
riod criminal opportunity. The equilibrium V ct is a concave function of the criminal
opportunity drawn in the current period, reflecting the concavity of the instantaneous
utility function. Conversely, V ut and Vcb are independent of the current realisation. The
threshold criminal opportunity is given by the intersection of the V u and V c curves. Any
opportunity with higher value induces the agent to commit crime: V ct > V
u
t . Likewise,
any opportunity with a lower value is rejected in favour of searching for a job.
A second feature can be discerned from Figure 2. As the probability of receiving high
value criminal opportunities increases (as we move from the top panels to the bottom),
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Figure 2: The value of crime, V ct , searching, V
u
t , and expected continuation payoff from
being unemployed, Vcb in stationary equilibrium with constant unemployment insurance
(b = 0) for different distributions of criminal opportunities.
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the expected continuation payoff from remaining unemployed, Vcb grows. From (4) and
(5), this raises both V ut and V
c
t . However, since β(1 − φ)Vcb > β(1 − p(a
∗
cb))Vcb, the
expected lifetime payoff from crime, V ct , increases more. Accordingly, the threshold
criminal opportunity declines, as predicted by Proposition 3.
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Figure 3: The effect of increase in the expected criminal opportunity on the utility gain
from employment, search effort and the threshold criminal opportunity in stationary
equilibrium with constant unemployment insurance (b = 0).
Figure 3 illustrates how increases in the likelihood of receiving high value criminal
opportunities (measured by raising the parameter µ) exacerbate moral hazard deriv-
ing from unobserved search effort. The top panel displays how the utility gain from
employment (the difference between the continuation payoffs from employment and un-
employment) varies. Changes in µ have no effect upon the value of employment. V e is
constant. However, Vcb is increasing in µ, following the argument outlined for Figure 2.
V e − Vcb −
1
rβ
declines. The higher continuation payoff makes getting a job less urgent,
encouraging the agent to engage in crime. Accordingly, the threshold criminal opportu-
nity declines. As benefits are constant, only the dynamic effect is in action. The agent’s
criminality increases, contributing to a longer expected duration of unemployment.
When Vcb increases, it gets closer to V
max. The utility gain from employment declines.
Following (8), the marginal benefit of search effort is reduced. Since the marginal cost is
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constant (and therefore unaffected), the prospect of greater criminal opportunities also
lowers a∗cb. Since an unemployed agent expects to receive higher lifetime utility, hunting
for a job becomes less urgent. Moral hazard is indeed made worse (Proposition 1). Note
that, when µ = 0, we are in an crime-free environment (almost surely). In this case,
the stationary equilibrium search effort, a∗cb, is equal to that of Hopenhayn and Nicolini
1997.
Table 2: Stationary solution under bt = 0 for increasing probabilities of receiving high
criminal opportunities and increasing punishment.
APD a∗cb r c
∗
cb V
u Vcb E [V
c]
Absence of Criminal Opportunities
0 307 3.43E-04 0 16759 16759 0
Criminal Opportunities (µ = 1000)
6 295 3.57E-04 76 16884 16885 16885
9 297 3.54E-04 83 16860 16861 16861
12 299 3.52E-04 90 16840 16841 16840
15 301 3.50E-04 97 16824 16824 16823
18 302 3.49E-04 104 16810 16810 16808
Criminal Opportunities (µ = 5000)
6 232 4.54E-04 49 17544 17549 17548
9 247 4.27E-04 60 17393 17398 17397
12 258 4.08E-04 70 17272 17276 17274
15 268 3.94E-04 81 17173 17176 17174
18 275 3.83E-04 91 17091 17093 17090
Criminal Opportunities (µ =∞)
6 183 5.75E-04 33 18058 18067 18066
9 209 5.05E-04 45 17790 17796 17795
12 229 4.61E-04 58 17581 17586 17584
15 245 4.31E-04 70 17414 17418 17416
18 257 4.09E-04 82 17280 17283 17280
Note: V e = 20000.
Table 2 provides numerical values of the stationary equilibrium solution under con-
stant unemployment insurance reported in Figure 2. It also shows how this is affected
by changes in punishment, represented by the monthly APD. For reference we also re-
port the solution in the absence of criminal opportunities.7 E [V c] is the expected utility
from committing crime, before any opportunity has been realised. It is computed by
calculating V c for each possible ci, and then weighting this by the associated probability
qi from (18). As higher criminal opportunities become more likely, or as punishment
becomes less severe, E [V c] increases.
7This is calculated assuming that the probability that ct = 0 is unity in all periods.
22
Table 2 show that greater search effort is exerted in the absence of crime. When
criminal opportunities are available, an increase in the severity of punishment reduces
the expected continuation payoff from remaining unemployed. In turn, the threshold
criminal opportunity increases (from (10)) or, equivalently, the agent’s criminality de-
clines. It also increases search effort from (8), as the utility gain from finding a job is
higher.
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Figure 4: Increasing unemployment benefits under constant unemployment insurance.
Figure 4 illustrates how the stationary solution changes in response to increases in
the unemployment benefits (Lemma 1). The figure reports adjusted utility gain from
employment, V max − Vcb, search effort, a
∗
cb, and the threshold criminal opportunity, c
∗
cb.
When b = 0 the equilibrium solution corresponds to that in the second panel of Figure
2, with numerical values reported in Table 2. The probability of getting a job is 0.1.8
Under this simulation, the probability of finding a job is 0.1 when b = 0, but falls as
b increases. The figure clearly shows that an increase in the level of constant benefits
paid by the government increases the value of remaining unemployed. The incentive
to search declines (as per (8)), as the utility gain from getting a job (V e − Vcb) is
smaller. p(a∗cb) declines, exacerbating moral hazard and increasing the expected duration
8The solution is derived following the same algorithm described in the previous section under constant
unemployment insurance with the only difference that r is fixed at 4.08E-04 throughout.
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of unemployment. At the same time the threshold criminal opportunity declines, due
to the dynamic effect. V ct increases faster than V
u
t . The agent’s criminality increases.
This further raises the expected duration of unemployment, as the agent is less likely to
search in any given period (as per Proposition 1).
When benefits increase to b = 30, the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed
reaches V max. The adjusted utility gain from employment is zero. The marginal cost of
effort always exceeds the marginal benefit, and the agent chooses a∗cb = 0. At this point,
increasing benefits has no additional effect.
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Figure 5: Increase in wages under constant unemployment insurance.
Figure 5 shows how the solution changes in response to an increase in wages (Lemma
2). Higher wages increase the payoff of getting a job relative to remaining unemployed
(top panel). From (8) the agent’s optimal search effort increases (bottom-left panel).
Although higher wages feed back into a higher continuation value from unemploy-
ment (which, by the dynamic effect, reduces c∗cb), they also have a direct effect on the
threshold opportunity (in (10)). With an improvement in the formal labour market,
the opportunity cost of any criminal activity is higher. This more than offsets the dy-
namic effect, and the threshold criminal opportunity increases (bottom-right panel).
Higher wages result in the both the agent’s expected duration of unemployment and his
criminality declining.
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7.2 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
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Figure 6: Optimal unemployment insurance with low criminal opportunities (µ = 200,
solid line) and in the absence of crime (dotted line).
We now focus on optimal unemployment insurance. Figure 6 displays the situation
with low expected criminal opportunities (the solid line). Over time, the government
reduces the benefit it provides to the agent (top-left panel). By doing so, it creates
a declining continuation payoff schedule from remaining unemployed (top-right panel).
As Vt+1 falls, the marginal benefit to search effort increases from (8), as the welfare
gain from finding a job gets larger. The agent applies more effort whenever he searches
(bottom-left panel).
Declining benefits and continuation payoff also affect the incentive to commit crime
through the static and dynamic effects. Clearly, the dynamic effect dominates. As
the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed declines, the agent begins to reject
criminal opportunities that he would previously have accepted. The need to find a job is
increasingly pressing. The threshold criminal opportunity increases (as per Proposition
4, see the bottom-right panel).
The dotted line in Figure 6 shows the situation without crime, and allows for a
comparison. Since the expected criminal opportunity is very small, Vt+1 is very close to
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V ut+1 (the continuation payoff from unemployment in the absence of crime). The expected
utility that the agent receives from any given benefit schedule is thus very similar in either
case. In spite of this, the two schedules are very different. When crime is present there
is greater front-loading of benefits, as the government takes advantage of the dynamic
effect (Lemma 3). By generating an increasing threshold criminal opportunity, the
government is able to reduce the expected damage from the agent’s criminal activities.
This additional incentive causes the government to reduce benefits faster. However, the
total amount of welfare it must provide is the same with or without crime. It therefore
offers much higher benefits during the early stages of unemployment, and lower benefits
in the later stages. More extensive front-loading of benefits results.
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Figure 7: Optimal unemployment insurance with high criminal opportunities (µ = 600,
solid line) and in the absence of crime (dotted line).
Figure 7 illustrates a second feature of the optimal benefits schedule. When more
valuable criminal opportunities become more likely (µ = 600), the government expects
the agent’s instantaneous utility to be higher in each period. The agent will supplement
his formal income with crime. Whilst the government suffers from this additional crime,
it is able to reduce the benefit payments (top-left panel) made to the agent in every period
whilst still maintaining the promise-keeping constraint (equation (17)). Note that, once
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again, we have more extensive front-loading of benefits. Even with lower benefits in
every period, the government still reduces them by a much greater proportion in the
presence of crime during the early stages of unemployment. In turn, this causes the
continuation payoff Vt+1 to diverge from that in the absence of crime (top-right panel).
Comparing optimal search effort and threshold criminal opportunity in Figures 6 and
7 yields some interesting insights. When more profitable criminal opportunities become
more likely, the expected damage caused by the agent’s criminal activities increases.
This creates an incentive for the government to pay an even greater proportion of the
promised welfare in the early stages of unemployment. Although the payments are
relatively costly, the rapidly declining continuation payoff induces much higher search
effort and higher threshold criminal opportunities (the bottom panels). It becomes
more likely that the agent will both search for a job, and be successful in that search.
Consequently, in every period, the agent is less likely to accept a criminal opportunity.
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Figure 8: Optimal unemployment insurance with low criminal opportunities (µ = 200)
as crime becomes more damaging: δ = 1 (solid line); δ = 4 (dashed line); and δ = 8
(dotted line).
Figure 8 illustrates the effect of an increase in the social cost of crime on the optimal
unemployment benefit schedule and its implications for crime and search effort (Lemma
3). As the damage from crime increases, the agent’s criminal activity features more
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prominently in the decision of the government. It thus seeks to reduce the amount of
crime committed by reducing the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed (top-
right panel) even more rapidly. This affects the incentives of unemployed individuals
to search for a job: firstly he applies more effort as the continuation payoff from em-
ployment is now significantly higher than that from unemployment (bottom left panel).
Secondly, he foregoes criminal opportunities he would previously accepted in order to
devote more time to searching for a job (bottom-right panel). In order to reduce the
continuation payoff without changing the promise-keeping constraint the government
front-loads benefits to a greater and greater extent (top-left panel).
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Figure 9: Optimal unemployment insurance with low criminal opportunities (µ = 600)
as crime becomes more damaging: δ = 1 (solid line); δ = 4 (dashed line); and δ = 8
(dotted line).
Figure 9 shows the effect of increasing the damage from crime when the expected
criminal opportunity is relatively high. The intuition is identical to that of Figure 8. As
crime becomes more damaging, the government has an increasing incentive to front-load
benefits. However, in a high criminal opportunity environment, the expected damage
caused by crime becomes even more acute. The government front-loads to such an extent
that benefits rapidly decline to zero. At this point, the government has reached the end
of its influence. We enter a situation equivalent to constant benefits (with bt = 0). The
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agent maintains a constant search effort and threshold for criminal opportunities. His
continuation payoff derives solely from expected future criminality and the possibility of
receiving a job. In a similar manner to A´lvarez Parra and Sa´nchez 2009, this continuation
payoff is endogenously bounded above zero by the presence of crime.
8 Conclusions
Engaging in crime whilst unemployed is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, crime
supplements legitimate income from unemployment benefits. On the other, it makes it
more likely that an agent will remain unemployed. Knowing that he can supplement
future income with criminal activity reduces the incentive to apply search effort, lowering
the likelihood of successfully acquiring a job. Time taken to commit crime further
reduces searching. In this sense, crime exacerbates moral hazard deriving from the fact
that the government cannot observe the agent’s actions.
When benefits decline, the marginal benefit of search effort increases. Conditional
on looking for a job, the agent applies more effort. The effect on criminality is unclear.
The instantaneous marginal utility from criminal opportunities increases (a static effect)
providing a greater incentive to commit crime. Each opportunity is worth more to the
agent. However, the continuation payoff from remaining unemployed also declines. This
provides a counterbalancing incentive (a dynamic effect), potentially reducing criminal-
ity. With a higher probability of remaining unemployed, a criminal suffers more from
this decline. For a reasonable calibration, this dynamic effect dominates.
The existence of opportunistic crime has interesting implications for optimal unem-
ployment insurance. Firstly, the government can offer lower benefits whilst still providing
individuals with sufficient welfare. Secondly, the dynamic effect provides an additional
reason to reduce benefits over time. By doing so, the continuation payoff from remaining
unemployed falls. This not only provides greater incentives to apply search effort, but
may also lower the criminality of the unemployed agent.
Our findings are in tune with insights from dynamic social contracting theory with
private information. In the absence of crime, the government wants to provide insurance
to smooth the allocation of consumption among employed and unemployed. At the same
time, it recognises that the provision of this insurance induces moral hazard behaviour.
By front-loading benefits, the government increases the effectiveness of the insurance in
the interest of the society as a whole. Front-loading is driven by an efficiency, rather than
a punitive, motive. Recent work shows that front-loading distortions are ultimately an
optimality principle and illustrate this for a broad class of environments (Albanesi and
29
Armenter 2012). We have illustrated this for a special type of economic environment:
one with random criminal opportunities. As crime induces even greater moral hazard,
society has a further reason to provide greater incentive for the unemployed to search for
jobs. The increase in the front-loading of unemployment benefits is a natural implication
of social contracting theory when applied to an economic environment with crime.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Given {bt}
∞
t=0, the agent will commit a crime in period t if and only if:
V ct ≥ V
u
t
⇐⇒ u(bt, ct) ≥ u(bt, 0)− a
∗
t + βp(a
∗
t )V
e + β(φ− p(a∗t ))Vt+1 − βφV
p,
where a∗t is the agent’s optimal choice of effort given {bt}
∞
t=0. The left-hand side is strictly
increasing in ct, whereas the right-hand side is independent of ct. Therefore, there exists
a unique c∗t such that (10) holds. The agent will commit a crime if and only if ct ≥ c
∗
t .
This completes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The probability that the agent commits a crime in any given period during
which he is unemployed is 1 − F (c∗t ). His criminality is increasing in the continuation
payoff from unemployment if and only if c∗t declines as Vt+1 gets larger.
From equation (10), we have that:
∂c∗t
∂Vt+1
=
β [φ− p(a∗t )]
uc(bt, c∗t )
.
c∗t declines with the continuation payoff from unemployment if and only if φ−p(a
∗
t ) <
0. Rearranging this condition to solve for a∗t , we require that a
∗
t > p
−1(φ). For this to
hold, there must still be a gain for the agent from applying additional search effort
when at = p
−1(φ). From (8), we need that the marginal benefit of search effort when
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at = p
−1(φ) exceeds the marginal cost:
βp′(p−1(φ)) (V e − Vt+1) > 1
⇐⇒ Vt+1 < V
e −
1
βp′(p−1(φ))
.
Define V˜ ≡ V e − 1
βp′(p−1(φ))
. So long as Vt+1 < V˜ , c
∗
t is declining in the continuation
payoff from unemployment. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The Lagrangian for the government’s problem:
L (b∗t , a
∗
t , c
∗
t , Vt+1; θ, η, λ) = b
∗
t +
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
d(c, δ)f(c)dc+ β{1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]}C (Vt+1)
−θ
{∫ ∞
c=c∗t
u(b∗t , c)f(c)dc+ F (c
∗
t )u(bt, 0)− F (c
∗
t )a
∗
t
+ βF (c∗t )p(a
∗
t )V
e + β[1− F (c∗t )]φV
p
+ β{1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]}Vt+1 − Vt
}
−η
{
βp′(a∗t ) (V
e − Vt+1)− 1
}
−λ
{
u(b∗t , c
∗
t )− u(bt, 0) + a
∗
t − βp(a
∗
t )V
e
− β[φ− p(a∗t )]Vt+1 + βφV
p
}
.
Taking appropriate first-order conditions:
∂L
∂b∗t
=1− θ
{∫ ∞
c=c∗t
ub(b
∗
t , c)f(c)dc+ F (c
∗
t )ub(b
∗
t , 0)
}
− λ {ub(b
∗
t , c
∗
t )− ub(b
∗
t , 0)} ≡ 0, (19)
∂L
∂a∗t
=− βF (c∗t )p
′(a∗t )C (Vt+1)− ηβp
′′(a∗t ) (V
e − Vt+1) ≡ 0, (20)
∂L
∂c∗t
=f(c∗t ) {β[φ− p(a
∗
t )]C(Vt+1)− d(c
∗
t , δ)}+ λuc(b
∗
t , c
∗
t ) ≡ 0, (21)
∂L
∂Vt+1
=β{1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]}[C
′ (Vt+1)− θ]
+ ηβp′(a∗t ) + λβ[φ− p(a
∗
t )] ≡ 0. (22)
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The envelope condition yields C ′(Vt) = θ. Moreover, since Vt < V˜ , φ− p(a
∗
t ) < 0.
From (20) and (21), we have that:
η = −
p′(a∗t )F (c
∗
t )C(Vt+1)
p′′(a∗t ) (V
e − Vt+1)
> 0,
λ =
f(c∗t ) {β[φ− p(a
∗
t )]C(Vt+1)− d(c
∗
t , δ)}
uc(b∗t , c
∗
t )
< 0.
Rearranging (22) yields:
C ′ (Vt+1) = θ −
ηp′(a∗t ) + λ[φ− p(a
∗
t )]
1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]
.
Since φ− p(a∗t ) < 0, λ[φ− p(a
∗
t )] > 0. C
′ (Vt+1) < θ = C
′(Vt) by the envelope condition.
Since, by assumption, C is convex, Vt > Vt+1. The expected continuation payoff from
unemployment falls from period t to period t+ 1.
A declining continuation payoff implies that Vt+1 < V˜ . Thus φ − p(a
∗
t+1) < 0. By
the same analysis, Vt+2 < Vt+1. An inductive argument completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Suppose that we can write u(b, c) = u(b) + v(c). The threshold criminal oppor-
tunity from (10) is defined as follows:
v(c∗t ) = −a
∗
t + βp(a
∗
t )V
e + β[φ− p(a∗t )]Vt+1 − βφV
p.
The Lagrangian is:
L (b∗t , a
∗
t , c
∗
t , Vt+1; θ, η, λ) = b
∗
t +
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
d(c, δ)f(c)dc+ β{1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]}C (Vt+1)
−θ
{
u(b∗t ) +
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
v(c)f(c)dc− F (c∗t )a
∗
t + βF (c
∗
t )p(a
∗
t )V
e
+ β[1− F (c∗t )]φV
p + β{1− φ+ F (c∗t )[φ− p(a
∗
t )]}Vt+1 − Vt
}
−η
{
βp′(a∗t ) (V
e − Vt+1)− 1
}
+λ
{
v(c∗t ) + a
∗
t − βp(a
∗)V e − β[φ− p(a∗t )]Vt+1
}
.
This is a special case of Proposition 4, and so Vt is declining. The first-order condition
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for effort is:
∂L
∂b∗t
≡ 0 ≡ 1− θu′(b∗t ), , (23)
and the envelope condition yields:
C ′(Vt) ≡ θ.
Rearranging (23) and substituting for θ yields:
C ′(Vt) =
1
u′(b∗t )
.
As Vt is declining and C is convex, diminishing marginal utility implies that b
∗
t must
also decline. This completes the proof.
E Computational Method
E.1 Reduction of the government minimisation problem
The reduction of the dynamic optimisation of (16) to the minimisation over a single
choice variable Vt+1 is done as follows. Solving (8) for a
∗
t yields:
a∗t = max
{
0,
ln [βr (V e − Vt+1)]
r
}
, (24)
which expresses a∗ as a function of V . The above can be replaced into (10) with additive
separability to obtain:
c∗t = v
−1
(
−
ln [βr (V e − Vt+1)]
r
+ βV e − β (1− φ)Vt+1 −
1
r
)
, (25)
which expresses c∗t as a function of Vt+1. Then the promise-keeping constraint in equation
(17) can be solved as
b∗t = u
−1
(
−
∫∞
c=c∗t
v (c) f (c) dc+ F (c∗t ) a
∗
t − βF (c
∗
t ) p (a
∗
t )V
e
−β {1− φ+ F (c∗t ) [φ− p (a
∗
t )]}Vt+1
)
, (26)
which formulates b∗t in terms of Vt+1, both directly and through a
∗
t and c
∗
t derived from
(24) and (25) respectively. Using these results, the Bellman equation (16) can be written
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as
C (Vt) = min
Vt+1
{
b∗t +
∫ ∞
c=c∗t
d (c, δ) f (c) dc+ β {1− φ+ F (c∗t ) [φ− p (at)]}C (Vt+1)
}
,
(27)
where a∗t , c
∗
t and b
∗
t are derived from (24), (25) and (26).
E.2 Upper and lower bounds
The continuation value Vt+1 is included within a bounded interval
[
V min, V max
]
. The
upper bound is the continuation value paid by the government that would induce zero
search effort. When imposing a∗t = 0 into equation (8), the upper bound is therefore
calculated as:
V max = V e − (rβ)−1 .
The lower bound is the continuation value paid by the government that would induce
maximum search effort. This is consistent with the stationary equilibrium solution for
Vt+1 when the government provides no insurance. In this case, the agent’s problem
is still described by equations (3)-(7), for bt = 0. This problem is stationary, as the
continuation payoffs, conditional on being employed or unemployed are independent
of the current period action. The agent’s optimal choices a∗t and c
∗
t , along with the
optimal continuation payoff V min are given by the solution to the following system of
simultaneous equations:
v (c∗t ) = −a
∗
t + βp (a
∗
t )V
e + β [φ− p (a∗t )]V
min − βφV p,
1 ≥ βp′ (a∗t )
(
V e − V min
)
,
V min =
∫∞
c=c∗t
v (c) f (c) dc+ F (c∗t ) v (c
∗
t ) + βφV
p
1− β (1− φ)
.
The first equation defines the threshold criminal opportunity, c∗t , that makes the agent
indifferent between searching or committing crime. The second defines the optimal
search effort, a∗t , in the absence of unemployment insurance. The third equation gives
the resulting continuation payoff.
E.3 Chebyshev regression algorithm
We recall that the n-degree Chebyshev polynomial is pn (x) =
∑n
i=0 αiTi (x), with
T0 (x) = 1, T1 (x) = x and Ti+1 (x) = 2xTi (x)− Ti−1 (x) for i = 1, ..., n. The Chebyshev
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regression algorithm works as follows.
1. Compute the m > n + 1 Chebyshev interpolation nodes on the interval [−1, 1];
zk = − cos
(
2k−1
2m
pi
)
, k = 1, ...,m.
2. Adjust the nodes to the interval
[
V min,V max
]
; Vk = (zk + 1)
(
V max−V min
2
)
+ V min,
k = 1, ...,m.
3. Set initial arbitrary values for the Chebyshev coefficients, αi, i = 1, ..., n. Given a
Vk ∈
[
V min,V max
]
form the approximation of C (V ) on the right side of equation
(27); Ĉj (V ) =
n∑
i=0
αiTi
(
2 Vk−V
min
V max−V min
− 1
)
. Use this in combination with a∗, c∗ and
b from equations (24), (25) and (26) to compute the right side of equation (27).
This gives the value Ĉj (V ) of the approximated cost function at iteration j given
V = Vk and V = Vj both included in
[
V min,V max
]
. Use a numerical optimization
routine to search within the interval
[
V min,V max
]
the value of Vj that gives the
minimum Ĉj (V ) when V = Vk.
9 Denote this as Ĉ (Vk).
4. Repeat steps 3 for all Vk, k = 1, ...,m, derived in step 2. This gives the value of
the cost function approximated at the m Chebyshev nodes; Ĉ (Vk), k = 1, ...,m.
5. Update the Chebyshev coefficients using αi =
∑m
k=1 Ĉ (Vk)Ti (zk) /
∑m
k=1 Ti (zk)
2.
6. Replace the Chebyshev coefficients and repeat steps 3 - 5 until convergence.
The MATLAB programme used for the numerical computation is available upon re-
quest from the authors. This was constructed starting from a programme that replicates
the solution to Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997 available at http://dge.repec.org/codes/sargent/hugo/.
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